THIRD DIVISION
|
SIAIN ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, - versus - F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 146616 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: August
31, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Western Visayas Industrial
Corporation (WESVICO) filed on September 18, 1973 a foreshore lease application
over the foreshore land adjacent to certain lots registered in its name,
located in Loboc, Lapuz, La
Paz, Iloilo City, including Lot 3309. It
eventually withdrew the application and filed on March 1976 a petition for
registration over the same foreshore land with the then Court of First Instance
of Iloilo. The case was, however,
archived as WESVICO’s representative could no longer
be contacted.
It
appears that WESVICO ceased to hold operations and its properties including
On
In
the preliminary investigation report[3] on
F.F. Cruz’
. . . I personally visited the area applied
for by the herein applicant and found that the same is actually occupied and
used by them as a sanctuary of their marine equipment which they are using in
their construction work of the
x
x x x[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner Siain Enterprises Inc. (SIAIN), who purchased from the DBP
the properties previously owned by WESVICO including
Upon learning
that 130 linear meters of the foreshore land subject of F.F. Cruz’s foreshore
lease application overlapped that covered by its foreshore lease application,
SIAIN filed on January 9, 1987 a protest[8]
alleging that it being the owner of the property adjoining the overlapping
area, it should be given preference in its lease.
On March 6,
1987, the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Iloilo City, by Resolution No. 174,[9]
approved the recommendation of its Committee on Finance that “for the mutual
interest” of F.F. Cruz and SIAIN, SIAIN would get 70 linear meters and F.F.
Cruz would get 60 linear meters of the disputed area, in light of its finding
that, among other things, both SIAIN and F.F. Cruz would “contribute
substantially to the economic growth of the City of Iloilo.”
Concurring
with the Sangguniang Panglungsod, the Land Management Bureau (LMB)
through its Director, by Order[10]
of
. . . While it cannot be denied that protestant is now the registered owner of
the property adjoining the foreshore in question, the disputed foreshore cannot
be considered to have been built or formed by means of accretion but is a
reclaimed land made by respondent F.F. Cruz and Company for the purpose of utilizing the same in the
loading and unloading of their equipment and materials and for the repair and
maintenance of said equipment which respondents use in the reclamation of the
Iloilo City Port. This is supported by the findings of the
District Land Officer Norberto Bernas who, in his
letter dated February 18, 1984 to this Office, reported that he personally
visited the foreshore in question and found that the same is now actually
occupied and used by the respondent company as a sanctuary of its marine
equipment which it is using in its construction work of the Iloilo City Port
and that a portion of the land applied for has already been filled up by the
applicant to be utilized in the repair and maintenance of
its equipment and in the loading and unloading of materials it uses in the
construction of the Iloilo City Port. It
is therefore clear that the foreshore in question is neither an accretion nor
an accessory to protestants’ property. While protestant SEI appears to be owner of
the property adjacent to the disputed foreshore, it cannot be considered as a
riparian owner within the contemplation of the aforementioned law.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Accordingly,
the LMB disposed:
WHEREFORE,
it is ordered that the protest of SIAIN Enterprises, Inc. be, as it hereby it
is, dismissed and this case, dropped from the records. Both Foreshore Lease Application Nos.
(VI-5) 220 and (VI-1) 176 of SIAIN Enterprises, Inc. and F.F. Cruz and Co.,
Inc. respectively, shall be amended in such a way that SIAIN’s application shall cover SEVENTY (70) linear meters
of the disputed foreshore adjoining Lot 3309 while F.F. Cruz’s application
shall cover SIXTY (60) linear meters thereof.
Accordingly, both applications shall be give due course in
accordance with the provisions of the Public Land Law, otherwise known as
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.[12] (Underscoring supplied)
SIAIN
appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), arguing that the LMB:
1. . . . made [a] false
assumption of fact when it considered the foreshore area under . . .
controversy as reclaimed land;
2. . . . committed a
grave error in not considering the preferential right of the riparian
owner/littoral owner, . . . to apply for a lease over the foreshore under
controversy; [and]
3. . . . erred in
awarding sixty (60) linear meters of the foreshore under controversy to [F.F.
Cruz].[13]
By
Decision[14] of
It
is blatant error to consider the contested area as reclaimed land as it has no
basis in fact, in law and jurisprudence.
The
area in question is unquestionably a natural foreshore for which
various applicants prior to the herein parties have applied. CRUZ’s
F.L.A. No. (VI-1) 176 itself which was filed on July 7, 1983, long after it had
allegedly filled up the area undeniably shows CRUZ’s
admission that it is a foreshore and not something else.
The
assumption that the contested area is a reclaimed land runs smack against the
provision of Article 5 of the Spanish Law on Waters of
“Lands
reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by
provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall
become the property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise
provided by the terms of the grant of authority.”
We
cannot find in the records anything to show that a “permission”
was ever sought by or granted to, CRUZ for the alleged reclamation of the land
in question.
x
x x x
It
is by reason of the Director of Lands’ erroneous classification of the
contested area as “reclaimed” that he awarded 60 linear meters thereof to
CRUZ. However, as heretofore discussed,
the said area in question is clearly a natural foreshore and SIAIN is correct
in claiming it to be so. Hence, the
law that applies in this case is Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No.
7-1 which was issued by the Secretary of the then Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources . . .
x
x x x
It
is an undisputed fact that SIAIN is the registered owner of the land adjoining
the foreshore area in controversy. Hence
SIAIN is the riparian/littoral owner
insofar as the contested foreshore area is concerned and should enjoy the preferential right to lease the
entire one hundred thirty (130) linear meters of said area adjoining
its property, which includes the sixty (60) linear meters thereof awarded to
CRUZ in the questioned Order.
x
x x x[15]
(Emphasis supplied;
underscoring partly in the original and partly supplied)
The DENR Acting Secretary thus ordered that the application
of F.F. Cruz be amended to exclude the disputed foreshore area adjacent to Lot
3309 and that SIAN’s application be given due course.
F.F. Cruz appealed to the Office of the President,
contending that the DENR Acting Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion:
I. IN
DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU THAT THE
CONTROVERTED AREA IS A RECLAIMED LAND UNDERTAKEN BY
APPELLANT F.F. CRUZ . . .
II. IN
RULING THAT [SIAIN] HAS A PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE;
[and]
III. IN
ISSUING THE SUBJECT DECISION CONSIDERING THAT HE IS NOT EMPOWERED BY LAW OR
RULE TO ISSUE THE SAME.[16]
By Decision[17] of
Records
reveal that WESVICO, who may be considered as the real riparian owner, had
previously availed itself of the preferential right to apply for the foreshore
area adjacent to its property. However,
it withdrew its application, and instead sought the titling of said property
via a petition for registration filed with the court, which eventually
archived the case for petitioner’s lack of interest. In net effect, WESVICO’s
preferential right adverted to, albeit initially pursued, was thereafter
abandoned due to its voluntary withdrawal of the corresponding application
and its erroneous resort to some other mode of acquisition, i.e., the filing
of a petition for registration. Consequent
to such abandonment, it may be said that WESVICO had already waived its
preferential right over the controverted area at
the time SIAIN purchased the adjacent property. As vendee, SIAIN was subrogated not
only to the rights and actions of its predecessor-in-interest, WESVICO, but
also to the absence/lack of those.
Also
decidedly going for CRUZ is the fact that it applied for the disputed area, occupied
the same and introduced improvements thereon long before SIAIN filed its own
lease application. Subject to
certain exceptions, it is axiomatic in public land grant that he who is
first in time is preferred or stronger in law – Priore
in tempore, potior jure.
It
may be, as stated by the DENR, that the contested area abuts upon the titled
property of SIAIN, a circumstance which ordinarily would accord that firm a
preferential right to lease the property in question, the rule being that a
riparian/littoral owner enjoys preference over the abutting foreshore lands
formed by accretion or alluvial deposits.
x
x x x
. . . The principle thus enunciated
in Santulan properly applies where the
adjoining lot is a natural foreshore, meaning that the foreshore was formed by
what may rightfully be considered as accretion, or the settling down, by natural
causes, of soil, earth and other deposits.
But such is not what it obtains in this case, contrary to the
bare assertion of the DENR Acting Secretary that the “area
in question is unquestionably a natural foreshore.” . . .
x
x x x
Not being the product
of accretion, the disputed strip of foreshore land cannot be the proper subject
of a riparian or littoral claim.
x
x x x
The
actuality of the DENR not formally granting CRUZ a permit to undertake reclamation
works on the disputed area can be conceded. But in the light of the Bernas
report, .
. . there can be no quibbling
that CRUZ occupied and raised, thru filling, the area to its present level,
with the implicit consent, if not approval, of lands authorities. That consent and/or approval have been given
may be deduced from the fact that the Bureau of Lands required the payment of,
and received from appellant, the amount of P40,032.00
as occupation fee. Any suggestion that
CRUZ, after paying the occupational fee, merely planted itself on the disputed
area without as much as dredging and filling the same is unacceptable. In a very real sense, therefore, the
reclamation work undertaken by CRUZ was with the proper permission, or at least
the acquiescence of the Bureau of Lands, the agency which, following Insular
Government v. Aldecoa (19 Phil. 505), is empowered to
grant such permit in behalf of the DENR Secretary.[18]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In its petition for review before the Court of Appeals,
SIAIN raised the issues of 1) whether
the disputed area is reclaimed land or foreshore land and if found to be
foreshore land, 2) whether SIAIN has preferential right to lease the same.[19]
By Decision of
Hence, the present petition for review filed by SIAIN.
SIAIN contends that the evidence overwhelmingly proves that
the disputed area is foreshore land and not reclaimed land as found by the
Office of the President. It invites
attention to F.F. Cruz’s own declaration in its foreshore lease application
that the disputed area is a “parcel of foreshore land.” To SIAIN, this declaration is equivalent to a
judicial admission which does not require proof and is conclusive as to
it.
Further, SIAIN argues that the records reveal that the only
evidence relied upon by the Office of the President is the Bernas
report which speaks of a portion allegedly filled-up by F.F. Cruz, the
identity, location and size of which were never established; and that there is no evidence to prove that
the filled-up portion is one and the same as the disputed area, but that even
assuming that it is, F.F. Cruz cannot have a better right over it as the
reclamation was made without the necessary permit, hence, it cannot be allowed
to benefit from its own wrongdoing.
Furthermore, SIAIN contends that there can be no waiver of
preferential right over the disputed property, no advice from the Director of
Lands having been communicated to WESVICO, DBP or SIAIN of their preferential
right to lease the adjacent foreshore land, and therefore, the 60 days within
which they are supposed to apply[21]
has not begun to run.
The key to the present controversy lies in the
classification of the disputed area.
The DENR Secretary found that the disputed area is a
“natural foreshore,” hence, it concluded that SIAIN, being a littoral owner
(owner of land bordering the sea or lake or other tidal waters[22]),
has preferential right to lease it as provided in paragraph 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated
32.
Preference of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining
foreshore lands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands
adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject
to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he
applies therefore within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a
communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential
right.[23]
(Emphasis supplied)
The DENR Secretary found the LMB’s classification of the disputed area as “reclaimed”
erroneous for lack of basis in fact, law and jurisprudence.
On the other hand, while the Office
of the President recognized the preferential right of littoral owner WESVICO,
it held that it had waived its preferential right and SIAIN, as
successor-in-interest, was subrogated to WESVICO’s
right or lack of it.
The Office of
the President went on to hold that since the disputed area is already reclaimed
land, it cannot be subject to littoral claim, SIAIN, not being the littoral
owner within the contemplation of the law, citing Santulan
v. The Executive Secretary[24]
which elucidated on the principal reason for giving a riparian or littoral owner
preferential right, thus:
Now,
then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the
preferential right to lease the foreshore land abutting on his land?
That
rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866 which provides that, while lands added to the shores by
accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of
the public domain, such lands, when they are no longer washed by the waters of
the sea are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the
establishment of special industries, or for the coast guard service,” shall be
declared by the Government “to be the property of the owners of the estates
adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.”
In
other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral
(riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by
accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea.
The
reason for the preferential right is the same as the justification for giving
accretions to the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by
reason of the destructive force of the waters.
So, in the case of littoral lands, he
who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession.[25] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Furthermore,
as reflected above, the Office of the President, finding that F.F. Cruz’s
occupation and introduction of improvements on the contested area long before
SIAIN filed its lease application, held that “it is
axiomatic in public land grant that he who is first in time is preferred or
stronger in law.”
The
petition is impressed with merit.
That
the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not remove it from its
classification of foreshore area subject to the preferential right to lease of
the littoral owner.
It
bears noting that it was not the reclamation that brought the disputed
foreshore area into existence. Such
foreshore area existed even before F.F. Cruz undertook its reclamation. It was “formed by accretions or alluvial
deposits due to the action of the sea.”
Following Santulan, the littoral owner
has preferential right to lease the same.
Contrary
to the ruling of the Office of the President, as affirmed by the appellate
court, littoral owner WESVICO cannot be considered to have waived or abandoned
its preferential right to lease the disputed area when it subsequently filed an
application for registration thereover. For being a part of the public domain,
ownership of the area could not be acquired by WESVICO. Its preferential right remained,
however. Its move to
have the contested land titled in its name, albeit a faux pas, in fact more than proves its interest to utilize it.
As
correctly argued by SIAIN, were WESVICO’s petition
for registration which, as stated earlier, was archived by the trial court,
pursued but eventually denied, WESVICO would not have been barred from filing
anew a foreshore lease application.
Parenthetically, the petition for registration of WESVICO was archived
not on account of lack of interest but because it ceased operations due to
financial reasons.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated
The
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
DANTE O.
TINGA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 90 (dorsal side).
[2] Land Management Bureau (LMB) folder, p. 61. (The LMB folder is paginated from pp. 307-1).
[3]
[4]
[5] Ibid.
[6] LMB folder, p. 147.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] DENR folder, pp. 95-90. (The DENR folder is paginated from pp. 188-1).
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Court of Appeals (CA) rollo, p. 18.
[20] Penned by Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. and Demetrio G. Demetria, id. at 219-227.
[21] Paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order
No. 7-1 dated
[22] Santulan v. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. L-28021,
[23] In Santulan (supra note 22), this Court held:
The word “riparian” in paragraphs 32 and 4 of the departmental regulations is used in a broad sense as referring to any property having a water frontage. Strictly speaking, “riparian” refers to rivers. A riparian owner is a person who owns land situated on a bank of a river.
But in paragraphs 32 and 4, the term “riparian owner” embraces not only the owners of lands on the banks of rivers but also the littoral owners, meaning the owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The littoral is the coastal region including both the land along the coast and the water near the coast of the shore zone between the high and low watermarks.
[24] Supra.
[25]